ON MAY 6, KAZAKH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TOKAYEV PROVIDED CHARGE WITH THE FOLLOWING DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT, WHICH THE KAZAKH SIDE PROPOSES BE SIGNED AT THE TIME OF PRESIDENT NAZARBAEV’S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE U.S. TOKAYEV STRESSED THAT THE U.S. HAD AGREED TO A SIGNED JOINT STATEMENT DURING RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN’S LAST VISIT TO THE U.S. TOKAYEV SAID THAT NAZARBAEV WAS VERY KEEN TO HAVE A SIGNED JOINT STATEMENT. NAZARBAEV HAS ALSO EXPRESSED THIS VIEW TO US DIRECTLY.

CHARGE UNDERTOOK TO TRANSMIT THE DRAFT TO WASHINGTON. HE NOTED THAT AS A RULE THE U.S. PREFERRED NOT TO ISSUE SUCH JOINT STATEMENTS, BUT HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF THE VIEW THAT KAZAKHSTAN WANTED EQUAL TREATMENT WITH RUSSIA. CHARGE SAID THE NUCLEAR LANGUAGE IN THE DRAFT WAS TOTALLY INADEQUATE, BUT THIS MATTER WOULD BE SETTLED AT HIGH LEVELS. HE ALSO SAID SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ON CSCE AND NACC WAS NEEDED.

IF WASHINGTON IS WILLING TO WORK TOWARD A JOINT STATEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD PREPARE A NEW DRAFT WITH MORE SPECIFIC CONTENT. IT MIGHT INCLUDE:

O NAZARBAEV’S PLEDGE TO SIGN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE CHARTER OF PARIS AT HELSINKI IN JULY;
O A COMMITMENT BY KAZAKHSTAN TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN THE HELSINKI PREPARATIONS, THE CSCE PROCESS, THE NACC, AND THE JCIC;
O A PROMISE BY KAZAKHSTAN TO PURSUE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS, AND PROMOTE ETHNIC TOLERANCE;
O SPECIFIC DENUCLEARIZATION LANGUAGE OF THE KIND WE SEEK;
O COOPERATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS CONTROL;
O COMMITMENT ON EXPORT CONTROLS.

WE PRESUME THAT WHATEVER STATEMENT IS ISSUED DURING THE KRAVCHUK VISIT WILL INFLUENCE WHAT WE SHOULD PROPOSE TO THE KAZAKHS, WHO WILL HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE KRAVCHUK STATEMENT.